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Nonlinear Corporate Taxes and Asset Pricing
Abstract
This paper addresses the implications of non linear taxes for
standard single period asset pricing models. In particular, the paper
discusses problems in estimating the market model and in testing the
CAPM, that may arise under conditions of non linear taxes and changing
tax shields. Some possible implications are discussed for event
studies that rely on the cumulative residual or similar techniques.
Finally, a correction factor is developed for the problems due to
changing tax shields under nonlinear tax system.

Nonlinear Corporate Taxes and Asset Pricing
Firms may shield part of their income from taxation. Interest on
deht, depreciation and tax credits are convenient examples of such tax
shields. Such shields may be transferred in full, or in part, to other
tax years under the carry back/carry forward provisions. In the absence
of full and costless offsets, the effect of tax shields is to produce a
non linear tax function with "option like" qualities. Such characteris-
tics have been addressed recently in a number of studies. Majd and
Myers [9] examine the effects of tax non-lineari tv on the value of risky
investment opportunities facing the firm, and Green and Talmor [8]
address similar issues. Galai [6] and Pitts and Franks [11] examine
the value of the Government's tax "option" and its implications for
financine decisions. Smith and Stultz [12] show the effects of non
linear taxes on corporate hedging policies.
The purpose of the present paper is to address the implications of
non linear taxes for standard single period mean-variance asset pricing
models. We show that non linear taxes produce an estimation bias in
the market model under conditions of changing tax shields. Second,
the paper outlines problems that may arise in conventional tests of
CAPM. In particular, we show that the use of portfolio procedures to
address the "errors-in-variables" problem associated with the estimated
betas may not be effective if the error is due to changing tax shields.
Third, we discuss some possible implications for event studies that
use the cumulative average residual or similar techniques. In addi-
tion, a correction factor is developed for the beta estimates produced
bv the market model.
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I. ASSUMPTIONS AND NOTATION
Since our purpose Is to show the effects of tax non-linearities on
the standard mean-variance asset pricing model, we wi 1 L simplify the
tax structure by ignoring the partial offsets allowed under the carry
over provisions. This simplification corresponds with most of the
other papers cited earlier. All earnings above the value of the firm's
tax shield are taxed at the constant marginal rate (e.g., 46%). We
adopt one of the alternative assumptions associated with CAPM that the
earnings of the firm before tax are approximately normally distributed.
Under proportional taxes, a proportional claim on the firm's earn-
ings is equivalent to a proportional claim on its value. This feature
greatly simplifies the single period model. But with non linear taxes
we must address the sequence of taxable cash flows in order to derive a
capitalized value. To keep within the spirit of the single period model
which we wish to evaluate, we will assume a "stationary" world in which
the distributions of relevant values, except tax shields, are held con-
stant. Thus, the distributions of pre tax earnings and the return on
the market portfolio are stationary. The riskless interest rate is
also held constant. Investors anticipate this stationarity and expec-
tations currently held on these values are not revised. However, tax
shields may change as may expectations concerning future tax shields.
These features permit isolation of the effects of tax shields on the
single period model.
Notation
Y = pre tax corporate earnings
Y = after tax earnings
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V = value of the firm's pre Lax earnings
V = after Lax value of Lhe firm
T cornoraLe marginal Lax raLe
F(») = cumulaLive normal densiLy evaluaLed aL (•)
f(«) = normal densiLy evaluaLed at (•)
E( ) = expecLaLions operaLor
Cov( • • ) = covariance
E (•) = expecLaLion of (• ) having been LruncaLed from below at
A
A and above aL B
R = reLurn on markeL porLfolio
R = risk free raLe
S = Lax shield, earnings below S subjecL Lo zero Lax; earnings
above S Laxed aL Lhe sLaLuLory marginal raLe T
3 = before Lax beLa
3„ = afLer Lax beLa
IT. PROPORTIONAL TAXES
In a simple proporLionaLe Lax world, Lhe afLer Lax value of Lhe firm
will simply be Lhe before Lax value Limes one minus Lhe Lax raLe. This
is Lrue since all cash flows are subjecL Lo Lhe same Lax raLe, i.e.,
V
T
- (l-T)V. (1)
The before Lax raLes of reLurn LhaL would accrue Lo invesLors could
Lhey purchase non Laxed earnings would be
E(R) =4^" " 1 (2)
-4-
However, investors purchase after tax earnings for an after-tax value.
Consequently the after-tax return is
E(R
T ) =
-^2- ~ 1 - ECv(^t)
)
" l = E(R) (3)
which implies equality of the before and after tax betas
8
T
= B. (4)
For some purposes it may be useful to measure after-tax returns,
denominated hy the hefore-tax value, e.g., for evaluating the "fair"
return on a pre tax equity investment in a regulated industry. Tn such
circumstances, the post tax return would be (1-T) times the pre tax
return. But our purpose is to examine the valuation of post tax earn-
ings. In this context, we note the equality of pre tax and post tax
earnings and the equality of the pre tax and post tax hetas as shown by
equations (3) and (4).
III. NON LINEAR TAXES
A simple non linear tax structure can he expressed implicitly by
the after tax value of earnings Y
Y if Y <: S
Y
T
={- - (5)
Y(l-T) if Y > S
Pre tax earnings, Y, are assumed normally distributed and stationary.
From the properties of the normal distribution, the truncated after tax
earnings expectation and its covariance with the return on the market
portfolio can be expressed as (see Winkler et. al [14]).
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E(Y
T
) = F(Y) - TE
S
(Y)
= F.(Y)[1-T(L-F(S)] - Ta 2 (Y)f(S) (6)
and
Cov(Y
T
,R
>!
) = CovCY.R^^tl-TCl-FCS))] (7)
These expressions will he used to provide the after-tax value of the
firm.
From the single period CAPM, the firm's value at time t is
E (Y„ ,)-X Cov (Y„ . ,\L, . ) F (V,,
,
)-X Cov (\' ,,R )
t T,t+l t t T,t + 1' >1,t+l t T,t + 1 t t T,t+r M,t m
T,t
"'
L+R
ft
L+R
f(.
ka)
v
E
t + l
(Y
T
>
t + 2
)
-X
t + l
C°V
t + l
(Y
T
>
t^2>
R
M
>
t+ 2
)
T.t+1
-
1+Rf)t+1
,
E
t + l
(V
T,t + 2
)
-X
t + l
C0V
t + l
(V
T
>
t +2>N ) t + 2 )
i+R
f,t+l
and so on. Using the stationarity assumptions, and dropping time sub-
scripts, successive substitution yields the current after tax value V
F(Y ) - X Cov(Y R )
v
T
-
_l_j- L^L (9)
Substituting from (6) and (7) gives
E(Y) - X Cov(Y,R )
a
2 (Y)f(S)
V_ = f = =-][i-t(1-F(S))] - T[ { l
HS
]
l K
f
R
f
2
= V[1-T(1-F(S))] - T[ q
" (Y
^
fCS)
l (10)
R
f
It can be noticed that the after tax value is related to the
before tax value V, the tax rate T and the probability of paving tax
(l-F(S)). However, the second term in (10) also relates the tax
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liability to the variance of earnings. This is not surprising since
the taxman's claim is a simple call option, the value of which is
related to the variance of the underlying cash flow. Thus variance
enters, not because total risk is priced, but because it serves to
determine the value of the firm's tax liability.
Equations (6) and (10) now are used to determine the expected
after tax rate of return E(R ).
where M = 1-T(1-F(S))
N = To
2 (Y)f(S)
Tedious rearrangement gives a linear relationship between the after tax
return E(RT ) and the before tax return E(R)
MVR N(l-R )
E(V = E(R)[ MVR-^N ] + W^N" 1 (12)
= E(R)f
i
(V,T,a 2 (Y),R
f
,S) + f
2
( V,T,
a
2
( Y) ,R
f
, S
)
where f. and f» describe the functions defined by the respective square
brackets.
We now describe a comparable relationship between the before tax
and after tax betas, 6 and f? .
Cov(RT ,RM ) YT ,
;
T
3 pL =C0 v fa- n.R^/a 2
l-Cov(Y
T
,R
M
)/a 2 (13)
Substitution from (7) and (10) yields,
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VMR
8
T
=
^VMRf-N
= f
x
B (LA)
Thus, collecting together the relationships between the before and
after tax returns to the firm, and the before and after tax betas,
F.(R
T
) = f^F.CR) + f
2
(L2)
B
T
= f
x
B (14)
Now suppose that the single period CAPM holds on the after corporate
tax earnings delivered by the firm to its securityholders
E(R
T
) » R
f
+ 8
T
[E(R
M
)-R
f
] (15)
Then the comparable before tax relationship is established by substi-
tuting (12) and (14) into (15)
R
f
f
2
E(R) = y- ~ -p- + 8[E(RM )-R f ] (16)
The main results under the proportional and non proportional tax
structures are now summarized. The expression for firm value (equation
10), expected after tax return (equation L2) and beta (equation 14) all
degenerate to the proportional tax values (equations (1), (3) and (4)
respectively) if the tax shield is set at minus infinity. Such an
extreme tax shield is equivalent to a proportional tax. In general,
however, tax shields imply a higher after tax vaLue, a higher expected
return and a higher beta than would prevail in a proportional tax
environment.
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The results of this section imply that certain problems may arise
in the standard proportional tax analysis of CAPM. Such problems arise,
for the most part, with changes in tax shields. In particular, beta
estimation problems will arise if tax shields and investors' expecta-
tions concerning future tax shields are changing over the sampling
period. The next section hinges on this problem and develops a correc-
tion factor.
TV. PROBLEMS WITH NONLINEAR CORPORATE TAXES
A. Problems in the Market Model
A number of studies have raised questions on the validity of the
market model in terms of estimation of the systematic risk, and the
variance structure (i.e., the existence of unconditional and conditional
heteroscedast icities in the market model) (see Rev and Pinches [21,
Brown, Lockwood and Lummer [4], Giaccotto and Ali [7], and Bera, Bubnys
and Park fl]). Our analysis shows that the changes in tax shields have
a direct bearing on this issue.
Consider the market model in its anticipated form
R
T
=a
T
+ B"^ + e. (17)
2 —
where E(e ) and a (e ) is constant. The term R,^ reflects current
expectations of after-tax return including current expectations con-
cerning the tax shield S. 8 T is the anticipated beta arising from
current expectations. Furthermore, the values f. and f~ may be
defined on tax shields currently expected by investors. Estimating
the model on past data involves historic returns R__, based upon prior
-9-
values of the tax shields. The value of tax shields over the sampling
period is denoted _S and values f. and f« mav he similarly defined on
S. Now consider the implications of changing expectations concerning
tax shields. From equation (12),
jlj, = £X R + _f_2 and \ = "^i R + ~^2
Combining the above two equations,
r
t
= (jij. + (^/Tj)^ - X2 )(Ti /_f_ 1 ) (ia)
Substitution of eq . (18) into eq. (17) yields,
R-T -a.j.Cfj/fp + ^(^/T^I^ + 12 + C^/fjKe - 1^ (19)
Changes in tax shields will give rise to changing values of f. and
f„. Consequently, ordinary least squares regressions using historical
data will lead to biased estimators of anticipated betas unless adjust-
ment is made for the changes in tax shields. It is also apparent that
the complex error term in equation (19) does not necessarily follow the
convenient properties of the error, z and may be subject to heterosce-
dasticity.
B. Problems in the Testing CAPM
The two-step regression methodology for testing CAPM was introduced
by Black, Jensen and Scholes [3] and has been used extensively since.
The technique consists of a second-pass cross-sectional regression to
estimate the market price of risk where the estimated betas for this
regression are provided from first-pass time series regressions in the
preceding period. The second-pass regression is usually conducted on
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portfolios derived from the ranking of security betas estimated in the
first-pass. The formation of portfolios is undertaken because of the
"errors-in-variables" problem. The estimated security betas from the
first-pass, 8. may be stated as the true beta, B. plus an error e.
If the error terms are well behaved then their weighted average within
the portfolio should exhibit an expected value of zero and a variance
which asymptotically approaches zero as the size of the portfolio
increases.
The analysis of the market model above reveals a potential "errors-
in-variables" issue arising fro- changes in tax shields. We will show
that this form of error is not well behaved even if the changes in tax
shields are randomly distributed across firms. As a result, the second
pass regression wi 1 L produce biased and inconsistent estimators.
The betas required for the second-pass test reflect investors
expectations on the value of tax shields at the time denoted for the
second-pass, i.e., 8.™. However, the first-pass regressions produce
estimates of security betas, 8_. T , based upon tax shield expectations
held during the earlier sampling period. For example, using five years
data for the first pass, 6. T will reflect tax shields in place up to
five vears before the time of the second pass cross sectional run.
Thus we define
£iT ,B. T+U . (20)
From enuation (19) it follows that
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Now consider the implications of forming a "n" asset equally
weighted portfolio, subscripted p. The estimation error for the port-
folio beta, u , is:
u - - ^(f.,/7.,)8". T - - I I._ (22)p n —li li lT n IT
To produce acceptable estimators in the second pass regression, the
error term u should satisfy E(u ) = 0; a(u ) + as n + °°. The first
P P P
of these conditions (E(u ) = 0) will only be satisfied if the changes
P
in tax shields follow a stochastic process satisfying;
iT i
where 5 . is a random variable having E(5.) = and
fl-T(l-F(S ))]V R
f,
.
=
[l-T(l-F(S.))]V.R
f
- Ta
2 (Y )f(S )
[1-T(1-F(S. ))]V.R.
In
[1-T(1-F(_S ))]V R - Ta (Y )f(S )
Notice that under this process the changes in tax shield are related to
estimated betas. We cannot offer an economic process which would
satisfy equation (23). Moreover, if u is to satisfy a(\i ) as n •* °°
P P
then we must add the further restriction on the term 5..
l
Cov(5
.
,6 .) =
1' J
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BuL changes in tax shields across firms are likely to he responsive to
changes in the tax environment which simultaneously affects all firms.
Such systematic changes in tax shields would preclude the convergence
of u on zero. Thus, in general, we find no reason to suppose that
the "error-in-variable" term, u , will be removed with the formation
of portfolios if this error is due to changing tax shields.
C. Event Studies
The predominant methodology in event-studies is to specify a pre-
determined time interval on both sides of an event and the betas for
each security are estimated through the market model, using the data
prior to the predetermined time interval. These betas are in turn used
to estimate average abnormal rate of return for the time interval (see
Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll f5] for a typical example).
In light of the above analysis, problems may arise with residual
analysis if systematic changes in tax shield occur in event time. Of
particular concern is the prospect that some events chosen for residual
analysis might themselves be associated with a change in the value of
tax shields. For example, a merger between two firms may be associated
with a reduction in earnings variance which would in turn reduce the
value of the "taxman's" call option on the firms (see Pitts and Franks
[11]). But this effect would also operate through f. to change the
after-tax beta in event time. Divestitures may cause similar problems.
Such possibilities underscore the importance of testing for structural
change in the regression parameters surrounding the event date (see
Brown, Lockwood and Lummer [4] for a recent discussion). Tf such
changes may be reasonably associated with changes in tax shields (as
-13-
opposed to more general conditions such as informational uncertainty
surrounding the event), then empirical results may he misinterpreted.
D. A Correction to the Market Model
These problems can be addressed by correcting the beta estimates
produced by the market model. We know that the beta estimated by the
market model wi 1 1 reflect the expectations of the values of tax shields
held by investors during the historical period from which the sample
was taken, S. The anticipated market model is based upon current
expectations of tax shields, S. Thus, we may define betas before and
after adjustment of changes in tax shields as
8 = f 8
-T -1
and ?T = T.,8 = (fj/lj^JL,; (24)
Since we require an estimate of 8 T , but obtain an estimate of 8_,, the
multiplicative correction factor f
, / f_i shown above should solve the
problem.
From eq . (12)
f
l
/
-l
=
fM^
f
/(MVR -N)]/[OTR
f
/MVR
f
-N)] (25)
with M and N correspondingly defined on S and S.
Is this correction factor operational? Expected tax shields are
not observable. However, it may he reasonable to use actual average
tax shields in place over the data period to estimate S and the current
tax shield to estimate S. A further problem arises since the before
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tax value V also is not observable. But we can observe V botb
current Ly and during tbe data period. Substitution of V bv V_, from
eq. (LO) Leads to a more convenient form for the correction factor
V-l = KVTR f+N)/(VTR f +N)] • (VT /VT ) C26)
The effect of this correction factor on the observable form of the
market model may be seen by substitution into equation (19).
("V-^-T = *T + V*M + -2 (T 1 /-1 ) + G ~ ?2 (27)
But
*
T
= 1L R + I2 and *r
=V + ^2
yielding
Substituting; into (27) yields the following well behaved observable
form for the market modeL
(VIA = °T +FTRM + e (28)
V. CONCLUSION
The combination of non linear corporate taxes and changing tax
shields will give rise to estimation bias in the market model. This
bias is unLikely to be eliminated with the portfolio procedures usually
adopted for testing asset pricing models. Moreover, further problems
may arise in event studies particularly where the event itself affects
the value of tax shields. A correction for this estimation bias is
developed. The correction factor mav be used either to transform return
data to estimate the market model or equivalently correct the biased
estimators produced from unt ransf ormed data.
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Foot note s
Usinc the assumption of lognormal terminal values, a similar valua-
tion expression to equation (10) can be derived in an option pricing
framework. Treating the taxman's claim as T times a call option on the
before-tax value of the firm with the exercise price equal to the tax-
shield.
V
T
= V - TC(V,S)
Using the Black-Scholes option pricing model,
V
T
= V - T[VN(h) - S'N(h - 0-/7)1
= V[l - TX(h)] + TS'N(h - a/7),
where S ' = S« e f
h = ln(V/S')/o7x + 1/2o7t
r
h
—
-x
2
/2
N(h) = / 1//2tt e ' dx
The parallels with the valuation derived under normality are clear
V
T
= V[l - T(1-F(S))] - Ta 2 f(S)/R
f
. (eq. 10)
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